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Excessive or Warranted? The Unshackling of
Discovery Sanctions in Lee v. Max International, LLC
I. INTRODUCTION
A core principle of the American legal philosophy is that disputes
should be decided on their merits. However, attorneys often wrangle
over legal procedure and deprive meritorious disputes of their day in
court. At times, the discovery process reflects a battleground with
little indicia of ethical advocacy.1 In Lee v. Max International, LLC,2
the Tenth Circuit correctly reproved an abusive litigant who was
granted substantial leniency during the discovery process. The court
sustained the most severe of sanctions—dismissal with prejudice.
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit correctly affirmed the
dismissal sanction provided under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) and appropriately followed Supreme Court
precedent. Those circuits that have not yet adopted the Supreme
Court’s framework should eliminate the inflexible tests they require
of their district court judges in deciding dismissal sanction cases. The
increased complexity and expense of discovery provides shameless
attorneys with a system in which they often can test the resolve of
the district courts and disregard their discovery obligations. The
Tenth Circuit’s opinion rightfully concluded that a district court
should not be required to discuss a detailed set of factors while
analyzing the appropriateness of a dismissal sanction. Any additional
test would be superfluous within the current dismissal framework
outlined by the Supreme Court.

1. For an example of aggressive advocacy gone awry, see Professor Charles Yablon’s
description of a libel suit brought by Phillip Morris Company against the American
Broadcasting Company. Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1618 (1996). The attorneys for Philip Morris responded to the
discovery requests of ABC with documents later referred to as “critically sensitive flavoring
documents.” Id. All of the estimated one million documents were printed on “red paper with
squiggly lines,” making them difficult to photocopy or read. Id. In addition, attorneys for ABC
claimed that the documents “gave off noxious fumes that made it difficult to work with the
altered copies for any extended periods of time.” Id.
2. 638 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2011).
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case began as many do. Markyl Lee filed a complaint
alleging that Max International breached a distributorship agreement
between the two parties.3 During the discovery process, Max made
standard discovery requests with which Lee did not comply, and Max
filed a motion to compel.4 The magistrate judge granted Max’s
motion and ordered that Lee produce “a variety of documents,” but
to no avail.5 In light of Lee’s disregard of the court order, Max filed
a request to dismiss the case. Fortunately for the plaintiff, the court
granted Lee one additional opportunity to satisfy the court order by
producing the requested documentation.6 The judge was clearly
frustrated with Lee’s disobedience and issued a warning that
“‘continued non-compliance [would] result in the harshest of
sanctions.’”7
After the court’s warning, Lee declared to the court that he had
complied with the court order, even though he had only provided a
few of the requested documents.8 Max was not satisfied with Lee’s
efforts as evidenced by a letter he sent to Lee “claiming that various
materials still remained missing.”9 Lee did not respond to the letter
and Max renewed his motion to dismiss, which apparently motivated
Lee to provide more of the requested documents. In the intervening
weeks prior to the judge’s decision on the motion to dismiss, Max
received more of the remaining documents.10
As the documents trickled in, the magistrate judge reviewed the
motion to dismiss.11 It was obvious to the court that Lee had not
complied with the court order at the time of his sworn declaration.
Apparently, what motivated Lee was not necessarily the court order,
but the fear of possible sanctions. The magistrate judge was not
pleased with Lee and recommended to the district court that it grant
Max’s request for dismissal, which it did, dismissing the case with

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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prejudice.12 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit sided with the district
court and affirmed the dismissal.13
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Rule 37 Sanctions
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may
seek a motion to dismiss in the event that an opposing party violates
a court order compelling discovery.14 Rule 37 states: “If a party or a
party’s officer, director, or managing agent . . . fails to obey an order
to provide or permit discovery . . . the court where the action is
pending may issue further just orders,” which may include
“dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.”15 The
word “failure” and its derivatives were part of the earliest edition of
the rules.16 However, the text of the various subsections of the first
edition continually switched back and forth between the usage of
“failure” and “refusal.”17 This “aimless shuttling between ‘refusal’
and ‘failure’” caused difficulty in the “administration [of the rules]
outside the courts [and] flexible use in them.”18
Arguably, the subtle, yet meaningful, difference between
“failure” and “refusal” caused a misapplication of the rules. For Rule
37 sanctions, the distinction was critical because, at that time, the
rule provided sanctions for a party that refused to obey a court
order.19 On occasion, this phrase caused courts to interpret the rule
only to allow sanctions when a party had refused, and not simply
failed, to obey the order.20 The persistence of this distinction was

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); see also 8B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2281 (3d ed. 2011) (“[A]ny party or person who seeks to
evade or thwart full and candid discovery incurs the risk of serious consequences.”).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
16. WRIGHT, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
480, 489 (1958).
19. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
20. Jodi Golinsky, Discovery Abuse: The Second Circuit’s Imposition of Litigation-Ending
Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Discovery Orders: Should Rule 37(b)(2) and Dismissals be
Determined by a Roll of the Dice?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 585, 592 (1996).
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one of the reasons that later motivated a change in the rules:
removing “refusal” from the rules altogether.21
The Supreme Court sought to limit the minor distinction that
had played out in the lower courts.22 In Societe Internationale v.
Rogers,23 the Court made it clear that this “too fine a literalism”
between “failure” and “refusal” created an inappropriate distinction
between the subsections of the rules.24 According to the Court, this
was an unintended distinction upon which lower courts should not
rely.25
In 1970, the Advisory Committee replaced “refusal” with
“failure” to align the rules with the Supreme Court’s interpretation
in Societe Internationale.26 This clear interpretation and subsequent
modification of the rules reflected the Court’s and the Committee’s
intention to close a potential loophole for unyielding attorneys. Both
institutions made it clear that a litigant that simply failed to obey a
discovery order, as opposed to refusing to obey, could potentially
face dismissal of his case. The new direction represented an
expansion of potential dismissal actions.
Because dismissal is the most severe of sanctions, the Court
recognized that there may be instances where dismissal would not be
appropriate.27 The Court in Societe Internationale outlined a
difference between which litigant actions warranted dismissal and
which actions required a lesser sanction. The Court said that Rule 37
“should not be construed to authorize dismissal of [a] complaint
because of petitioner’s noncompliance with a pretrial production
order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due
to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of
petitioner.”28 Therefore, a failure to comply with a court order
because a litigant lacks the ability to comply with the order does not
warrant dismissal.29 The potential for dismissal comes when a failure
21. Id. at 592–93.
22. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1958).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 207.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 212.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 2283 (The two principle facets of the constitutional
limits stemming from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are: “First, the court must ask
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to comply falls within the “willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of
petitioner” analysis.30
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Commitment to Enforce Dismissal
Sanctions
In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its intention to enforce sanctions when a
litigant fails to comply with a discovery order.31 Previously, the
Supreme Court was mostly concerned with the sanctions affecting
the litigants appearing in the current case. However, National
Hockey represented an effort by the Court to provide a general
deterrent to all litigants contemplating disobedience of discovery
orders.32
Over a seventeen month period, the plaintiffs in National Hockey
failed to answer various interrogatories submitted by the defendants
during discovery, continually “flouting” the court’s discovery orders
and timelines.33 In dismissing the case, the district court stated that
the plaintiff’s actions represented a “callous disregard of
responsibilities counsel owe to the Court and to their opponents.”34
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, overturned the district
court’s decision.35 Utilizing the language of Societe Internationale,
the court found that there was insufficient evidence that the failure
to act “was in flagrant bad faith, willful or intentional.”36 The court
reasoned that new counsel was representing the litigant, that counsel
had a difficult time “obtaining some of the requested information,”
and that “none of the parties had really pressed [the] discovery”

whether there is a sufficient relationship between the discovery and the merits sought to be
foreclosed by the sanction to legitimate depriving a party of the opportunity to litigate the
merits. Second, before imposing a serious merits sanction the court should determine whether
the party guilty of a failure to provide discovery was unable to comply with the discovery.”).
30. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 212. See also Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 70 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1995).
31. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
32. Id. at 643 (Allowing a district court to dismiss is not only “to penalize those whose
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted
to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.”).
33. Id. at 640, 643.
34. Id. at 640.
35. In re Prof’l Hockey Antitrust Litig., 531 F.2d 1188, 1195 (1976), rev’d sub nom.
Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
36. Id.
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obligations.37 According to the Third Circuit, the litigants’
extenuating circumstances warranted leniency.38
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit explaining that
lenity is certainly a factor to consider when imposing sanctions under
Rule 37, but it is not the only factor.39 The appellate court
undoubtedly felt the significant weight that a dismissal with
prejudice imposes. However, the Supreme Court explained that
lenity “cannot be allowed to wholly supplant other and equally
necessary considerations embodied in [the] Rule.”40 The Court
further explained that hindsight creates a natural tendency to
minimize the severity of sanctions, which can result in a court
incorrectly reversing an earlier dismissal.41 Because of this tendency,
the Court held that it was necessary to balance the role of lenity with
that of enforcement, because it is equally as important not to allow
litigants to “flout . . . discovery orders.”42
By overturning the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court minimized
the “willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner” language of
Societe Internationale.43 After National Hockey, questions still remain
as to whether any showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault is still
required.44 Also, some suggest that through National Hockey the

37. National Hockey, 427 U.S. at 640 (1976). (The Supreme Court listed a summary
of factors considered by the Third Circuit: “[N]one of the parties had really pressed discovery
until after a consent decree was entered between petitioners and all of the other original
plaintiffs . . . . [R]espondents’ counsel took over the litigation, which previously had been
managed by another attorney . . . . [R]espondents’ counsel encountered difficulties in
obtaining some of the requested information . . . . [And] respondents’ lead counsel assured the
District Court that he would not knowingly and willfully disregard the final deadline.”).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 642.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 643.
43. See Eric. C. Surette, Annotation, Sanctions Available Under Rule 37, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Other Than Exclusion of Expert Testimony, for Failure to Obey Discovery
Order Not Related to Expert Witness, 156 A.L.R. Fed. 601, *3a (2011) (“While the Supreme
Court in Societe Internationale Pour Particpations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers . . . held that before a complaint can be dismissed the district court must make a finding
that the offending party’s failure to comply with a discovery order was the result of willfulness,
bad faith, or fault, the continued viability of this holding is in doubt in light of National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.”).
44. Id.
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Supreme Court not only endorsed “utiliz[ing] the extreme sanction
of dismissal,” it encouraged it.45
The Supreme Court has consistently reformed the rules in favor
of enforcing dismissal sanctions. From the earliest amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Court’s opinion in
National Hockey, the Court has attempted to provide a procedural
deterrent to unrestrained attorneys. The Societe Internationale
language, “willfulness bad faith, or any fault of petitioner,” is helpful
in analyzing the difference between a litigant’s failure to comply and
an inability to comply. However, this language was later minimized
in favor of a harsher standard in National Hockey. Arguably, the
Court’s trend reflects a desire to remove hurdles that prevent district
courts from enforcing discovery sanctions.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In Lee v. Max International, LLC, the Tenth Circuit determined
that Lee’s failure to comply with the magistrate judge’s discovery
orders represented “strong evidence of willfulness and bad faith,”
and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice.46
The plaintiffs argued that the district court had not discussed
what is colloquially referred to in the circuit as the Ehrenhaus test
when it dismissed the case with prejudice. The Ehrenhaus test
emphasizes five factors for the district court to consider:
[A] court may wish to consider when deciding whether to exercise
its discretion to issue a dismissal sanction: (1) the degree of actual
prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the
judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the
court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action
would be a likely sanction for non-compliance; and (5) the efficacy
of lesser sanctions.47

However, the circuit court concluded that these factors “do not
represent a rigid test that a district court must always apply.”48 The
court said that the facts may be helpful in determining when
45. Golinsky, supra note 20, at 593.
46. Lee v. Max Int’l LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 2011).
47. Id. at 1323 (citing Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921(10th Cir. 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
48. Id.
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dismissal is warranted, but a “district court’s failure to mention or
afford them extended discussion does not guarantee an automatic
reversal.”49
Additionally, the court adopted a general deterrence policy.50
The court accepted the principle that “district courts must have
latitude to use severe sanctions for purposes of general deterrence.”51
V. ANALYSIS
The decision in Lee v. Max International, LLC, correctly
sustained the Rule 37 dismissal sanction. By pronouncing a general
deterrent, the Tenth Circuit rightfully sought to motivate litigants to
comply with discovery orders or face unforgiving sanctions. The
Tenth Circuit’s opinion concluded that a district court is not
required to discuss a detailed set of factors while analyzing the
dismissal sanction. Arguably, a specific test or detailed set of factors
would be superfluous to the current framework provided by the
Supreme Court. Those circuits that have not yet adopted the
position of the Supreme Court in National Hockey should eliminate
the stringent tests necessary for review of dismissal sanction cases.
Courts should instead encourage early judicial intervention in the
discovery process. Encouraging courts to enforce discovery
obligations earlier in the case through court orders will not only
preempt discovery abuse but it will also provide a stronger warning
to litigants. This early intervention must be sustained through the
courts’ continued support of a general deterrence policy. A general
deterrence policy will further support the early judicial intervention
principles—preempting abuse and providing a warning.
A. The Circuit Courts Should Eliminate the Superfluous Tests and
Afford Discretion to the District Courts
Among the various circuit courts, no single test or approach has
been adopted in more than one circuit.52 The circuits’ varying
approaches are representative of the uncertainty that pervades the
dismissal doctrine. Arguably, the Supreme Court has attempted to

49.
50.
51.
52.
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encourage the lower courts to enforce the sanction without a need
for a detailed list of factors that a district court must consider.
However, these tests or lists remain.
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have each
outlined some form of a test.53 For example, in the Ninth Circuit,
the district court is required to consider “(1) the public’s interest in
expeditious resolution of litigation, (2) the court’s need to manage
its dockets, (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions,
(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits,
and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”54 In the circuits
requiring specific factors, each court’s test differs from the other
circuits in the quantity of factors and substance of their tests.55
The remaining circuits, the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh, consider general guidelines that do not
subscribe to any specific factors.56 For example, the Seventh Circuit
stated that “[t]he cases in this circuit . . . do not set up a row of
artificial hoops labeled ‘bad faith’ and ‘egregious conduct’ and ‘no
less severe alternative’ through which a judge must jump in order to
be permitted by us appellate judges to dismiss a suit.”57 It is enough
to warrant dismissal in the Seventh Circuit when “a pattern of
noncompliance with a court’s discovery orders emerge[s].”58 As the
Seventh Circuit suggests, a pattern of noncompliance should be

53. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1330 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995)
(discussing the Third Circuit’s six factor test); Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Richards &
Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s four factor
test); FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s
several factor test); Beil v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994)
(discussing the Sixth Circuit’s several factor test); Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166
(9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s five factor test).
54. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994).
55. Supra note 53. See also Golinsky, supra note 20, at 603–04.
56. See Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1983). (discussing
the First Circuit’s adherence to National Hockey’s general deterrence doctrine); Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing the Second Circuit’s lack of “an
integrated code of sanctions”); Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1977)
(discussing the Eighth Circuit’s strong policy of deciding a case on its merits); see also
Golinsky, supra note 20, at 588, 596.
57. Newman v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 962 F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1992)
(citing Patterson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 852 F.2d 280, 284–85 (7th Cir.1988) (per
curiam); see also Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 1997) (Sufficient
egregious conduct warranted dismissal. In this case the record provided sufficient evidence of
egregious conduct.).
58. Newman, 962 F.2d at 591.
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sufficient to justify dismissal. Arguably, this approach more closely
aligns with the intention of the Supreme Court in National Hockey.
The Tenth Circuit has followed this line of reasoning by adopting
this principle in Lee. 59 In the Tenth Circuit, such a pattern of
noncompliance is prima facie evidence of willfulness and bad faith.60
The Tenth Circuit’s decision not to a adopt a specific test was
clearly explained in Lee.61 The court refused to require the district
court to review the list of factors included in the Ehrenhaus test.62
Many of the factors adopted by the circuits requiring tests are similar
to the Ehrenhaus test.63 In the Tenth Circuit, however, the test is not
really a test at all. Rather, it is a set of factors that could be
considered by a lower court before it imposes a dismissal sanction.64
The factors are more appropriately referred to as “guide posts [a]
district court may wish to ‘consider’ in the exercise of what must
always remain a discretionary function.”65 These “guide posts” are
not part of an exhaustive list of considerations,66 but merely an aid
for the district court to consider in exercising its discretion.
A district court is rightly afforded discretion when it comes to
matters of discovery because a district court judge deals with
discovery more often than an appellate court. As the Lee court
suggested, “discovery disputes are analogous” to the criminal
sentencing context in that the trial judge is in the best position to
rule on the issue and should have discretion.67 Similar to the criminal
context, the district court judges experience the attorneys’
maneuvering and schemes first hand. Arguably, requiring a district
court to consider a list of factors that are not inherently exhaustive
removes discretion and places unnecessary hurdles in the system.

59. Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1321 (2011) (“[A] party’s thrice repeated
failure to produce materials that have always been and remain within its control is strong
evidence of willfulness and bad faith, and in any event is easily fault enough, we hold, to
warrant dismissal or default judgment.”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1323.
62. Id. at 1324.
63. Supra note 53.
64. Lee, 638 F.3d at 1323; see also Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458,
1465 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
65. Lee, 638 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1320.
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On the most basic level, the Tenth Circuit has followed the
Supreme Court precedent. As emphasized in National Hockey, a
district court that has considered the entire record and made a
decision dismissing a case with prejudice has not necessarily abused
its discretion.68 The Tenth Circuit’s focus was on the review of the
entire record, not on a five factor test. The court sufficiently outlined
in Lee that the Ehrenhaus test is not determinative in dismissing a
case in the Tenth Circuit.69 The factors are general guidelines to the
district court as it performs its discretionary function in reviewing the
record. Those circuits requiring tests should follow the Tenth
Circuit’s approach because their rigid tests fail to afford the
appropriate level of discretion to the district courts and place
unnecessary hurdles in the way of appropriate sanctions.
B. Early Judicial Intervention and General Deterrence Are Key
1. Judicial intervention limits discovery time and expense
Discovery abuse thwarts the main goal of the FRCP “to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”70 Courts, practitioners, and clients all acknowledge that
the discovery process can unnecessarily increase both the time and
expense of litigation.71 Our system cannot simply remove discovery
from the process, so it must be modified. One significant way to
decrease discovery time and expense is for attorneys to honor
discovery requests and court orders. For obvious reasons, appealing
to an attorney’s altruistic desire to honor discovery requests and
comply with court orders will not prove effective. Instead, a
definitive approach to encourage compliance would be for courts to
engage with discovery early in litigation by issuing court orders
earlier in the process and to continue to deter other litigants from
noncompliance by utilizing the harsher dismissal sanction.
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and other legal institutions
recognize the problems imposed by the delays and cost of
discovery.72 In an effort to determine ways in which the system could
68.
69.
70.
71.

Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 641–42 (1976).
Lee, 638 F.3d at 1323.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY
SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2010).
72. Id. at 1–2.
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be improved, the FJC conducted surveys of various legal
practitioners.73 The surveys were a useful tool that resulted in
increased discussion of possible improvements to the FRCP.74 One
of the results of the surveys was a series of “Pilot Project Rules” that
were promulgated by the Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System.75 Rule Twelve of the pilot rules addresses
sanctions.76 It states that sanctions are “appropriate for any failure to
provide or for unnecessary delay in providing required disclosures or
discovery.”77 The rule is not dissimilar from Rule 37 of the FRCP.
Apparently, the newly drafted Pilot Project Rules seem to be based
on the idea that enforcement of sanctions should be based on a
failure to provide, or in other words, a noncompliance type
standard. This is in line with the Tenth Circuit’s approach and with
what the Supreme Court promulgated in National Hockey.
The FJC’s survey results also demonstrate that practicing
attorneys identify discovery as the primary cause of litigation delay;
one of the most common practitioner responses to the question
“about ‘the primary cause of delay in the litigation process’ was ‘time
to complete discovery.’”78 In addition, the survey suggests that
attorneys are disaffected with the finagling that goes on during the
discovery process. One attorney stated that “[d]iscovery abuse is
rampant—parties . . . stonewall routinely and then negotiate over
how many of their legal obligations they can avoid.”79 Regardless of
the inherently time-consuming nature of discovery, if the judiciary
were to engage in the discovery process earlier, discovery abuse could
be limited. Once a discovery plan is in place, the court should
enforce the timelines and reasonable demands of counsel seeking
compliance with the discovery order. Providing early warnings and, if
necessary, court orders will increase the integrity of the FRCP. The
judiciary can set the tone of the discovery stage early in the litigation
process and insist on compliance.

73. Id.
74. PAUL C. SAUNDERS & REBECCA L. KOURLIS, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS, REPORT FROM THE TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE 1–4 (2010).
75. 21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM PILOT PROJECT
RULES, INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2009).
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id.
78. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 71, at 2.
79. Id. at 8 n.13.
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Apart from the extended length of time, there are two additional
reasons why discovery is expensive. First, the lack of judicial
enforcement of discovery obligations not only increases the time it
takes to complete discovery, but it also increases the cost.80 Second,
the generally accepted law firm economic model provides an
incentive to increase the costs of discovery81 because lawyers may use
it as a way to increase the number of hours they bill to clients.82
While changing this economic model could be considered a desirable
outcome, encouraging such a change is probably not the most
effective solution. Rather, dealing with the first suggested obstacle
will necessarily impact the second. Arguably, encouraging the
judiciary to enforce sanctions will invariably affect the agency
problem inherent in the law firm economic model.
Early judicial intervention in discovery issues will decrease both
time and costs. Many practitioners agree that “[i]ntervention by
judges or magistrate judges early in the case helps to limit
discovery.”83 If discovery can be limited, it will more closely align
with the stated goals of the FRCP. By aligning discovery with the
stated goals, time and capital necessary to complete discovery should
decrease.
2. A general deterrence policy sustains the Rule 37 sanctions
In addition to early intervention, the judiciary should continue
to support a general deterrence policy. Such a policy was adopted by
the Supreme Court in National Hockey.84 Some have suggested that
this policy was one the Federal Rules did not intend.85 However, in
light of current practitioner opinion regarding the lack of respect and

80. Id. (Another attorney suggested that costs would decrease “if judges would
‘[e]nforce sanctions for discovery abuses. Much of the costs we deal with relate to trying to get
sufficient discovery—the delay and the costs of filing motions to compel, etc., increase costs
significantly.’”).
81. Id. at 1 (“The statement, ‘Economic models in many law firms result in more
discovery and thus more expense than is necessary,’ elicited more agreement than disagreement
in each of the surveys and among all groups.”).
82. Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s The Barrister
and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 649, 654 (1989).
83. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 71, at 2.
84. Golinsky, supra note 20, at 594.
85. Id. (“Prior to National Hockey general deterrence was not an established or even
articulated goal of sanctions, particularly the imposition of harsh sanctions.”).
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enforcement of the Rules of Civil Procedure,86 such a negative view
of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on dismissal is unwarranted. The
possibility that future parties could disregard their discovery
obligations suggests that providing notice of the potential for harsh
sanctions could deter them from such a decision. As the Second
Circuit concluded:
Negligent, no less than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects for
general deterrence. And gross professional incompetence no less
than deliberate tactical intransigence may be responsible for the
interminable delays and costs that plague modern complex
lawsuits. . . . [W]here gross professional negligence has been
found—that is, where counsel clearly should have understood his
duty to the court—the full range of sanctions may be marshalled.87

The Tenth Circuit has likewise employed a general deterrence
policy.88 The Lee court stated that “no one . . . should count on
more than three chances to make good a discovery obligation.”89
Apart from deterring future litigants, the policy will protect the
efficiency of the judicial system, help control court dockets, and
lessen the unfair prejudice imposed on unsuspecting litigants. Courts
will do well to continue to emphasize general enforcement of the
rules and protect future litigants and courts. A combined effort of
early intervention and general deterrence will increase the integrity of
the rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the egregious conduct of Lee in this case, the Tenth
Circuit correctly concluded that Lee’s disregard of discovery
obligations was strong evidence of willfulness and bad faith
warranting dismissal with prejudice. The court correctly came to this
conclusion by relying on the Supreme Court precedent in National
Hockey, an opinion that minimizes the need to follow a specific test
in order to determine willfulness or bad faith. The Tenth Circuit
recognized that a test or list of factors is not exhaustive and should
therefore only be used as potential considerations/guidelines for a
86. See supra Part V.B.1.
87. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d
1062, 1067–68 (2d. Cir 1979) (citations omitted).
88. Lee v. Max Int’l LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 2011).
89. Id. at 1319.
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district court considering the dismissal sanction. Those circuit courts
still enforcing a required list of factors should adopt the principles
espoused by the Tenth Circuit and supported by the Supreme Court.
In this way, district courts will be afforded broad discretion in
making a determination regarding dismissal. Such determinations
will be less frequent and less damaging with early judicial
intervention in the discovery process. Furthermore, a general
deterrence policy, as outlined by the Tenth Circuit, will guide future
litigants and help ensure that they will comply with their discovery
obligations.
Daniel S. Mehr III*
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